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The Decree of 19 August 1848: The First 
Repatriation Commissions and Postwar 
Settlements Along the U.S.-Mexico 
Borderlands 
JOSÉ ANGEL HERNÁNDEZ† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like all other wars that bring about destruction and chaos in their 
wake, these eventful ruptures in the historical structure are also 
moments of creativity and introspection surrounding the meaning of 
the nation, and its legacy. The end of the war simultaneously brought 
about the creation of the Department of Colonization because many 
amongst the intelligentsia believed that a failure to colonize and 
populate those areas lost to the US was the primary reason for this 
recent partition.1 To this end, the northern frontier was divided into 
three regions, and a Repatriate Commission was assigned to each: New 
Mexico, Texas and California.2 The primary function of these 
Repatriate Commissions, just like the Department of Colonization, was 
to identify, administer, and then to accommodate those Mexican 
citizens that opted to migrate southward across the new international 
boundary following the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
 
© 2018 José Angel Hernández 
† Ph.D. Department of History, The University of Houston. 
 1.  PROYECTOS DE COLONIZACIÓN PRESENTADOS POR LA JUNTA DIRECTIVA DEL RAMO, AL 
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA EN 5 DE JULIO DE 1848, (M. . .xico: 
Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1848) (1848) (Mex.). Full copy is available at CÓDIGO DE 
COLONIZACIÓN Y TERRENOS BALDÍOS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA, FORMADO POR FRANCISCO 
F. DE LA MAZA Y PUBLICADO SEGÚN EL ACUERDO DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA, POR 
CONDUCTA DE LA SECRETARÍA DE ESTADO Y DEL DESPACHO DE FOMENTO, AÑOS DE 1451 A 
1892, 368–398 (México: Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaria de Fomento) (1893) [hereinafter 
Código de Colonización]. 
 2.  See id. at 400–06; see also id. at 407–12. 
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(1848).3 Because the New Mexico Territory was the most heavily 
populated, the creation of the First Repatriation Commission for this 
region was considered the most important of the three eventual 
assignments.4 Post-war instabilities, strapped financial resources, 
shifting geo-political boundaries, resistance by U.S. authorities, and 
internal accusations of financial mismanagement and corruption all 
contributed to the dissolution of these initial Repatriation 
Commissions.5 Legislation implemented to encourage Mexican 
citizens to return via the Department of Colonization and the 
Repatriation Commissions provided both the power of the Law and the 
agents of the government to the foundation of dozens of settlements 
along the newly established frontiers.6 In the end, colonies nevertheless 
emerged along the northern frontiers between the New Mexico 
Territory and through Baja California, due in large part to the will and 
survival skills of the repatriates themselves.7  
With the fallout of the war between the US and Mexico unfolding 
during the signing of the treaties of peace in the mid nineteenth 
century, the question about Mexican citizens left in the ceded 
territories continued to be of concern for both countries particularly the 
question of citizenship. In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848),8 the Treaty stipulated that those 
individuals could either stay where they were at or they could leave 
south towards the shrinking International boundaries of the Mexican 
Republic.9 If they opted to stay, which recent estimates suggest that 
 
 3.  Id. at 11 (Original: “esas colonias en las costas y fronteras pueden y deben ser, con 
mayor éxito, compuestas de Mexicanos”). 
 4.   This article read as follows:  
“Artículo 22 de la ley de 14 de junio de 1848: “Queda autorizado el Gobierno 
para invertir hasta doscientos mil pesos del fondo de que habla el artículo 2º  (el 
de indemnización que paguen los Estados Unidos) de esta ley en la traslación de 
las familias mexicanas que no quieran permanecer en el territorio cedido a los 
Estados Unidos y soliciten establecerse en la República. Esta cantidad podrá 
aumentarse con presencia de los presupuestos respectivos, que el mismo 
Gobierno presentará al Congreso.” 
“Asunto: Ramón Ortiz—Nombramiento del citado para que pase a Nuevo M. . .xico,  
comisionado para la traslación de familias a territorio de la República, 1848,” ARCHIVO 
HISTÓRICO SECRETARÍA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES [HISTORICAL ARCHIVE OF THE 
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] L-E-1975 (XXV) [hereinafter AHSRE]. 
 5.  José Angel Hernández, El México Perdido, El México Olvidado, y El México de 
Afuera: A History of Mexican American Colonization 1836-1892, 195–220 (2008) (published 
Ph.D. dissertation, on file with University of Chicago). 
 6.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–12.  
 7.  JOSÉ ANGEL HERNÁNDEZ, MEXICAN AMERICAN COLONIZATION DURING THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A HISTORY OF THE US-MEXICO BORDERLANDS, 225–231 (2012). 
 8.  Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1850). 
 9.  Id. 
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70% remained within the territorial confines of the US, automatic U.S. 
citizenship was conferred within the year.10 For those that opted to 
leave, some very generous offers of land were made by the Mexican 
government in their efforts to try and resettle and repopulate the fringes 
of their decreasing borders with “Modern Mexicans” who had acquired 
particular modern skills in agriculture, livestock, and martial arts.11 
These historical circumstances and the Mexican government’s 
response to repatriation and settlement set a pattern in motion that 
continues to this day—the continuing circularity of Mexican migration 
in both the US and Mexico. 
To analyze and contextualize this particular legal history, it is 
important to examine a number of regional cases of repatriation 
beyond those from New Mexico, specifically a series of repatriations 
from the territories of Texas and California. In heretofore unexamined 
archival documents that detail the repatriation experience in a 
comparative fashion, I examine the formation of the first Repatriation 
Commissions charged with encouraging the repatriation of its citizens; 
a detailed examination of its initial efforts at recruiting repatriates; the 
work of establishing colonies along the frontiers of the new 
International Boundary; and the competing interests that pitted the 
realpolitik of state necessities against the pragmatic interests of 
repatriates themselves. Our examination of the process of repatriation 
to Mexico begins with a review of the establishment of the commission 
charged with this arduous task. The laws and decrees debated and 
passed by the Mexican Congress and Senate are a useful compass to 
follow in order to understand what entailed the first Repatriation 
Commission from the 1850s to perhaps more contemporary efforts by 
the Mexican government to accommodate the millions of repatriates 
that have arrived since, particularly those currently under the threat of 
deportation.12  
II. SOME NUMBERS AND CONTEXT  
Approximately “twenty-five percent of the total Mexican 
American population of the Southwest in the 1850s” returned to 
Mexico in the four decades following the end of hostilities, but more 
research into these particular numbers would be necessary for more 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412. 
 12.  For a broader outline, see Hernández, supra note 5. A condensed version of the two-
volume study appeared as HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 7. 
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accurate estimates.13 A number of scholars in the past generation have 
debated the number of Mexican citizens that were left in the ceded 
territories following the Mexican-American War, and their numbers 
have steadily fluctuated between 116,000 to upwards of 250,000, or 
around 1% of Mexico’s total population during this era.14 Mexican 
citizens in what is now the American southwest constituted around 1% 
of the total population of Mexico during this time, thus Mexican 
officials actively sought to repatriate and accommodate those Mexican 
citizens willing to move across the new international boundary 
following an end to hostilities.15 Although accurate figures would be 
almost impossible to determine because of the imprecision of 
statistical data then and now, a few studies have surfaced over the past 
few years that shed light on repatriation and return migrations. Some 
comparison with similar cases might be of use for gauging the number 
of return migrants during the middle to late nineteenth century, but 
these are merely comparative in nature. For instance, Historian Mark 
Wyman notes for the case of return immigrants in Europe that “During 
this era of mass immigration, from approximately 1880-1930 when 
restriction laws and the Great Depression choked it off, from one-
quarter to one-third of all European immigrants to the United States 
permanently returned home.”16 These particular historical trends 
therefore mirror in some parts those estimates that we read about with 
return migration to Mexico during the same periodization. Many of 
these studies, though, do not take into account the simultaneous 
migrations that occurred northward during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Here, it is important to underscore the 
simultaneous process of migration and return migration, then and now, 
before turning to the more concrete estimates of northward migration.  
If we calculate the estimates by the United States Census Bureau 
around 1910, or about six decades following the signing of the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1849, some estimates are that almost at a 
 
 13.  See RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE LOS ANGELES BARRIO: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY, 120 (1982). 
 14.  See Phillip B. Gonzales, The Hispano Homeland Debate: New Lessons, 6 
PERSPECTIVES IN MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES 123–141 (1997). For some numbers see Oscar 
J. Martinez, On the Size of the Chicano Population: New Estimates 1850–1900, 1 AZTLÁN: J. 
OF CHICANO STUDIES 43–67 (Spring 1975) (Martinez suggests that my lower range is his upper 
range; however, if one takes into account hispanicized Indians, or Genizaros, the number is 
conservatively closer to 250,000 so-called “Mexican citizens” in the ceded territories). 
 15.  LUIS ABOITES AGUILAR, NORTE PRECARIO: POBLAMIENTO Y COLONIZACIÓN EN 
MÉXICO, 1760-1940, (El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos: Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1995) (Mex.). 
 16.  MARK WYMAN, ROUND TRIP AMERICA: THE IMMIGRANTS RETURN TO EUROPE, 1880–
1930, 6 (1993). 
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quarter million Mexicans were being counted by the census, which 
needs to be factored into the equation.17 Migration and repatriation are 
processes that happen simultaneously thereafter and therefore difficult 
to calculate with any precision because of absence of institutions to 
perform a census, statistical data, or more concrete evidence. Thus, the 
number of Mexicanos that migrated south in the decades after the 
Mexican War continues to generate debate accompanied by a variety 
of conflicting numbers, but an estimate of 31,000, or around 25-30% 
of the total Mexican population residing in what is today the US 
Southwest may have returned.18   
III. THE FIRST FEDERAL REPATRIATION COMMISSION AND ITS MISSION 
Not long after the end of hostilities, the administration of José 
Joaquin de Herrera issued a decree on August 19, 1848, addressing 
“those Mexican families that are found in the United States and want 
to emigrate to their patria.”19 Issued shortly after the important July 5 
“Proyectos de Colonización,” the decree was considered an extension 
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signed at the beginning of that 
 
 17.  ARTHUR CORWIN, Early Mexican Labor Migration: A Frontier Sketch, 1848-1900, in 
IMMIGRANTS—AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE 
UNITED STATES 25–37 (Arthur F. Corwin ed., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978); see also 
JUAN GÓMEZ-QUIÑONES, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 1848-1980: An Overview, 
in CHICANO STUDIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56–78 (Eugene E. Garcia, Francisco 
A. Lomelí, and Isidro D. Ortíz, eds., New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 
1984). 
 18.  There are obviously debates about these numbers in the estimates for return 
migration, and they stand in stark contrast to the primary estimates. For instance, William 
Douglas Taylor, places the number at 3,000; however, he only cites the [Chihuahuan] study 
undertaken by Martín González de La Vara (1994), and then only this one case. Douglas states 
that: “Aunque no se sabe con exactitud el número de mexicanos que eventualmente se hayan 
mudado a México, se calcula que alrededor de tres mil personas aceptaron la oferta y 
volvieron” [“Even though the number of Mexicans who eventually moved to Mexico is not 
exactly known, it is calculated that about three thousand people accepted the offered and 
returned”]. See La Repatriación de Mexicanos de 1848 a 1980 y su papel en la colonización 
de la región fronteriza septentrional de México, 69 RELACIONES 18, 198–212 (1997). 
According to the First Repatriation Commission to New Mexico in early June 1848, Father 
Ramón Ortiz estimated that in addition to the 900 families that had already signed up to help 
found the colonies in Chihuahua, another 16,000 families totalling upwards of 53,000 souls 
could migrate south if monies were set aside for this endeavour. An additional $1,653,342 
pesos would be necessary if all of the potential repatriates opted to leave, or about $1,628,342 
pesos more than the original $25,000 that was initially extended. See Correspondence of 
Ramón Ortiz, in THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES, 148–49; AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-
2971. 
 19.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412. 
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year.20 All potential emigrants were free to make their own travel 
arrangements, according to Article 9 of the Herrera Decree, but they 
would still be obligated to notify the “commissioner at the time of 
enlistment, in order to have him present when making out the 
budget.”22 Twenty-five pesos would be allotted to each repatriate over 
the age of fourteen, and twelve pesos for those thirteen and under.23 At 
least on paper, local commissioners and state governments did their 
best to place those potential repatriates in colonies where their skills 
could be employed, especially agricultural and livestock specialists.24 
The 1848 decree instituting the Repatriation Commission for the three 
northern regions contains important stipulations that speak to a more 
nuanced and accurate view of the period.  Particularly telling are those 
orders calling for preferential treatment of repatriates and the 
distribution of authority for the repatriation project.  Much like the 
preferential treatment accorded the indigenes following Independence, 
or those migrating north from the center of Mexico, Mexicans residing 
in the “lost territory” were favored over foreign immigrants and other 
military colonists.  Article One of the decree states, “All of the 
Mexicans found in the territory during the celebration of peace that, 
because of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, remained in the power of 
the United States of [the] North, and want to come and establish 
themselves in that of the Republic, will be transferred to this one 
[Mexico] on account of the treasury and in the form established in the 
following articles.”25 The decree notably grants preferential treatment 
to repatriates, one of the many hallmarks of repatriation policies as the 
nineteenth century wore on.26 
The benefits decreed for repatriates reflected a perception of these 
returning migrants as ideal colonists that were now considered 
 
 20.  Consisting of two dozen articles, this comprehensive repatriation decree addressed a 
wide range of topics.  These included:  the composition of the commission, the states that 
would accommodate repatriates, the particulars of the repatriates’ travel back to Mexico, 
responsibilities and payments to repatriates, the salaries and duties of the commissioners, and 
agreements with state and federal officials concerning land.  
 21.  This article read as follows: “Artículo 22 de la ley de 14 de junio de 1848: “Queda 
autorizado el Gobierno para invertir hasta doscientos mil pesos del fondo de que habla el 
artículo 2º (el de indemnización que paguen los Estados Unidos) de esta ley en la traslación 
de las familias mexicanas que no quieran permanecer en el territorio cedido a los Estados 
Unidos y soliciten establecerse en la República. Esta cantidad podrá aumentarse con presencia 
de los presupuestos respectivos, que el mismo Gobierno presentará al Congreso.” AHSRE, 
supra note 4. 
 22.   Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412. 
 23.  AHSRE, supra note 4. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412. 
 26.  Id.  
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“modern” and therefore “civilized.”  Their attraction came in part due 
to the impression that they could fulfill the dual purposes of displacing 
foreign colonists and maintain the northern colonies as military 
outposts continuing their pacification of the indigenes of those regions.  
Article 6 declares: “The Mexicans that emigrate in virtue of this decree 
will have the right of preference so that all of the concessions that the 
law establishes or had established in favor of foreign colonists will be 
made to them.”27 Assistance would be extended to them in a “special 
manner,” and they would receive preferential treatment in the Military 
Colonies established by law on the 20 of July.28  Although foreigners 
would still be allowed to settle in these colonies, an individual review 
by the inspector of the colony was now required in each of these 
cases.29  
An abdication of federal authority to the states in the decree 
presented a major difficulty for repatriates as questions about available 
land and financial responsibilities were being articulated. Whereas the 
central government desired to be the final authority on immigration 
policy, the responsibility of providing for these migrants would 
ultimately fall to the states.  Article 7 states that “Governors of the 
states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Sonora 
and the primary political authority of Baja California, shall regulate by 
law, in the part that corresponds to each of them, the organization of 
the civil colonies that are to be founded by emigrants.”30 Land for the 
colonies should come from “arrangements with large landowners, or 
through whatever other means, that the emigrants find.”31 Article 22 
ceded even more authority to the state Governors when it noted that 
the Governors had final say in disputed matters. The federal 
government assigned very significant responsibility to state officials 
by stipulating that officials would negotiate with local hacendados to 
secure land for the repatriates.  The ongoing struggle to disintegrate 
the hacendado system was certainly part of the story behind the weak 
concentration of settlement in the north, further complicating the 
possibility of a well ordered repatriation program.32 In the end—and 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 400–07 (Articulo 24 of “Decreto de 19 
de Julio de 1848, y Reglamento expedido el día 20 del mismo mes, para el establecimiento de 
colonias militares en la nueva línea divisoria con los Estados Unidos de América”). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Jan de Vos, Una legislación de graves consecuencias: El acaparamiento de tierras 
baldías en México, con el pretexto de colonización, 1821-1910, 34 HISTORIA MEXICANA 76–
113 (1984) (Mex.). 
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even as some argued that repatriates would help fragment the 
hacendado stranglehold—most large landowners did very little to 
make land available for repatriates, or any other settlers for that 
matter.33 Simultaneously, various northern states provided lands and 
other incentives for repatriation before, during, and after the passage 
of the August 19, 1848 Decree—in many cases simply repopulating 
smaller towns along the border, as in the cases of modern day Tijuana, 
Baja California; Piedras Negras, Coahuila; and Ciudad Juarez, 
Chihuahua.34 
IV. APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSIONERS IN NEW MEXICO 
The decree in question was implemented through the appointment 
of three Repatriation Commissions appointed to each of the three 
frontier regions.35 Article 3 specified that “three commissioners were 
to arrange the migrations. Mexicans in Alta California were to receive 
land in Baja California or Sonora; those in New Mexico, land in 
Chihuahua; and Texas Mexicans, land in Tamaulipas, Coahuila or 
Nuevo León.”36 I would suggest that the repatriation operation should 
be located within a continuum of the postwar military realignment of 
the northern frontier as a whole since the tripartite schema was simply 
amalgamated to the newly formed Repatriation Commission. 
Repatriation policies, at least during the mid nineteenth century, were 
co-opted as military policies that included the pacification of the 
frontier, only this time with returning colonists.37 Despite the fact that 
the decree made a concerted effort to treat the repatriation of those 
military zones as a whole, the commissions were established at 
different times, under different circumstances, with different levels of 
investment, and they each ultimately met with differing levels of 
settlement and therefore “success.” In the western territory of Baja 
California, for instance, the governor of that state appears to have taken 
the lead in the designation of a Repatriate Commissioner with the 
 
 33.  Holden points out that such practices, at least in terms of claiming public lands 
(baldios) would under the presidency of Benito Juárez as the Ley sobre Ocupación y 
Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos (1863), but that the rush for public lands commenced during 
the Porfiriato. See ROBERT H. HOLDEN, MEXICO AND THE SURVEY OF PUBLIC LANDS: THE 
MANAGEMENT OF MODERNIZATION, 1876-1911, 3–24 (1994). 
 34.  HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 7, at 137–162. 
 35.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407-412. 
 36.  THOMAS EWING COTNER, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAREER OF JOSE JOAQUIN DE 
HERRERA, 1792-1854, 268–69 (1949); quoted in DAVID J. WEBER, FOREIGNERS IN THEIR 
NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS, 141–44 (1973). 
 37.  José Angel Hernández, Contemporary Deportation Raids and Historical Memory: 
Mexican Expulsions in the Nineteenth Century, 52:2 AZTLÁN: J. OF CHICANO STUDIES 115–
141 (2010). 
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appointment of Jesús Islas in 1856.38 Islas had stimulated a “Back to 
Mexico” movement only a few years earlier, but later was implicated 
in a filibustering expedition.39 In the Eastern provinces, Don Rafael De 
La Garza, a former treasurer for the state of Nuevo León was appointed 
as the Commissioner to repatriate Mexican families to Tamaulipas.  In 
1850 he declined this job offer from the central government.40 The case 
of New Mexico, when compared to Texas and California, had a 
categorically diverging historical experience due primarily to the 
demographic positionality of the region. 
New Mexico, the state with largest Mexican population, proved 
to be the most fruitful area for attracting repatriates. The territory, then 
known as Nuevo Mejico, was naturally targeted for repatriation and 
Father Ortiz, a leading politician, priest, and known patriot, was 
appointed to serve as its first representative.41 The appointment of 
Father Ortiz as the first commissioner in charge of repatriating 
Mexican families from New Mexico was initially without incident—
at least until he began to encourage the mass repatriation of Nuevo 
Mexicanos immediately following the war and allegedly violating 
some of the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.42 When Ortiz 
arrived in the county of Lerdo, New Mexico—where the general 
opinion of U.S. officials was that only a small portion of the local 
population wished to return to Mexico— Ortiz notes that “the 
inhabitants enthusiastically presented themselves to me, asking that 
they be enlisted with their families in order to pass to Mexican 
territory.”43 Father Ortiz was by his own account received positively 
wherever he went while serving as commissioner up until 1853.44 It 
was precisely along the border where most of the repatriation activity 
would eventually take place, and he found no lack of interest on the 
 
 38.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612. 
 39.  In my own research of these Repatriate Commissions, I found very little evidence to 
suggest that a commissioner was ever appointed for Baja California. It was not until 1855 that 
Jesús Islas was appointed to the post. Instead what one reads is an active Governor involved 
in the repatriation efforts, but only to a limited degree. I would argue that the formation of 
repatriate societies in California after 1849 is a phenomenon that questions the limits of state 
efforts to repatriate after the war. See Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612 
(“Disposición de 13 de Febrero de 1856: Promoviendo la emigración de la raza hispano-
americana existente en la Alta California, para aprovecharla en la colonización del Estado de 
Sonora”). This letter and four-point suggestion was also published in the 1856 publication of 
“Ministerio de Fomento,” 10 Mayo 1856. 
 40.  AHSRE supra note 4, at 2-13-1974. 
 41.  Id. at 2-13-2971. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at L-E-1975 (XXV); see English translation of letter in THREE NEW MEXICO 
CHRONICLES, 144–145; see also AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971. 
 44.  Id. 
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part of residents. Would-be repatriates in the area eagerly approached 
the commissioner to have their names placed on the list to migrate to 
Chihuahua. In one of his first letters to the Minister of Foreign 
Relations reporting on the conditions in El Paso Del Norte, Ortiz 
signals both the enterprise’s problems and its promise, i.e., the 
possibility of repatriating thousands of Nuevomexicanos.45 But worthy 
of note are his references to the kinds of individuals interested in this 
proposition.  According to Ortiz, 
To fulfil the commission that the Supreme Government 
has seen fit to honor me with, I find myself, after having 
surpassed the various obstacles that I have had to 
overcome, at the door of New Mexico, and even before 
entering I have the satisfaction of announcing to His 
Excellency that I have received about twenty distinct 
requests from middle class families to transfer to the 
territory of the Republic, and that according to the news 
arriving consistently from the nationals of that country, 
and according to foreigners that have recently arrived 
from the same, there should be at least from two to four 
thousand families disposed to emigrate, yet even 
though this news favors the generous desires of the 
Supreme Government of the Nation, it is accompanied 
by insurmountable obstacles for the emigration to occur 
this coming Spring.46 
In this initial report Ortiz clearly indicates that the vast majority 
of potential repatriates would not be taken from the middle class, but 
rather from families with more limited means:  “twenty requests were 
made by middle-class families while another potential two to four 
thousand families were prepared to move south with the Repatriate 
Commission.”47 Depending on whether we accept the two thousand or 
four thousand figures, the middle classes here constitute a mere 
percentage of the interested parties. What remains clear is that the visit 
 
 45.  Id. at L-E- 1975 (XXV), f. 135-137. Original: “Para cumplir con la comisión con que 
el Supremo Gobierno se sirvió honrarme me hallo ya apenas de los diversos obstáculos que he 
tenido que vencer a las puertas de Nuevo México y aun antes de entrar tengo la satisfacción 
de anunciar a V. E. que he recibido ya como veinte solicitudes distintas de familias de la clase 
media para pasar al territorio de la República y que según las noticias uniformes de nacionales 
de aquel país y extranjeros que recientemente han venido del mismo, debe haber lo menos de 
dos a cuatro mil familias dispuestas a emigrar, pero aunque esta noticia es tan favorable a los 
generosos deseos del Gobierno Supremo de la Nación, se presentan con todo obstáculos 
insuperables para que la emigración pueda ser en la próxima primavera.” 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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from the Repatriate Commission generated interest among the least 
fortunate, or those without lands in the New Mexico Territory.    
It also appears that for many repatriates, the decision to follow the 
new political boundaries of Mexico southward was a doubtful 
negation, in other words, a choice favoring the lesser of two evils. 
Early repatriates exhibited doubts about whether their rights would be 
respected as subjects of the US if they stayed in place, or to take their 
chances with a government seemingly in chaos and revolutions.  In a 
letter to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Governor of the state 
of Chihuahua, Ortiz explains that those of El Vado County receptive 
to repatriation “were willing to lose everything rather than to live in a 
country whose government gave them fewer guarantees than our own 
and in which they were treated with more disdain than members of the 
African race.”48 According to Ortiz, New Mexicans feared that, under 
a U.S. system of governance, they would be treated as second-class 
citizens.49 But as most of the literature illustrates for the nineteenth 
century Mexican American experience in the southwest, the vast 
majority of Nuevomexicanos opted to remain in place and hence under 
a US system of government. Moreover, the experience of 
Nuevomexicanos, despite these early and eerie warnings, partook of 
an experience that was fundamentally distinct from so-called members 
of the “African race.” 
Although Ortiz’ initial assessment of the prospects for 
repatriation was generally positive, he stressed the need for more 
money to offset these unforeseen circumstances having to do with the 
war and the unforeseen winter weather. Indeed, if one were to weave 
a petate, one of the many threads throughout the archival record is the 
states’ lack of funding, which is not without merit. The desire and 
demand, one could suggest, were in place at this time, but the monies 
were not, thus lessening the potential impact of return migration. Thus, 
like many others during the era, Father Ramon Ortiz made a dramatic 
appeal to the government of Mexico, sympathetically noting that the 
situation “makes one feel the hunger of those pueblos and this calamity 
will be a destructive beating to them after four months.”50 Regardless 
of whether Ortiz saw these conditions as a liability or potentially a 
strategic advantage for recruitment, from the perspective of repatriates, 
the decision to continue in colonies was perhaps tied as much to 
questions of survival than loyalty to the Mexican state.  In the balance 
 
 48.  Id. at 135–37. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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was Ortiz’ standing as saviour or scapegoat.  In the end, the vast 
majority of Nuevomexicanos stayed in place, while perhaps 25-30% 
may have returned in the four decades following the Mexican 
American war.51 
V. ISSUES WITH FUNDING AND FAVORITISM 
As already described, the desire to repatriate was much stronger 
than initially expected. It is not surprising, then, that the original 
amount of money allotted for repatriation was but a fraction of what 
Ortiz predicted for resettlement.52 The problems associated with 
finances, favoritism, and the cronyism of regional politics contributed 
to the early problems with repatriation, not to mention efforts by the 
US government to prevent the repatriation/depopulation of New 
Mexico after 1848. 
The reassignment of Ortiz from a national to a state-level 
commission may indicate that the federal government to some extent 
abandoned repatriation efforts after U.S. authorities challenged the 
Repatriation Commission. But the cost of this enterprise must certainly 
have been daunting to federal officials with perennially empty coffers. 
During his trip in the spring of 1849, the priest Ramón Ortiz indicated 
to the Ministry of Foreign Relations that he would need a great deal 
more than the first payment of $25,000 pesos.53 According to his 
calculations in early June of that year, Ortiz estimated that in addition 
to the 900 families that had already signed up to help found the 
colonies in Chihuahua, another 16,000 families totalling upwards of 
53,000 souls could migrate south if monies were set aside for this 
endeavour.54 An additional $1,653,342 pesos would be necessary if all 
of the potential repatriates opted to leave, or about $1,628,342 pesos 
more than the original $25,000 that was initially extended.55 Around 
92,000 fanegas of corn and almost 25,000 fanegas of beans, roughly 
an eight-month supply of food would be needed until the colonies 
could become self-sufficient.56 Accounting by the government of 
Chihuahua showed Ortiz as being at a deficit of almost $3,000 by the 
 
 51.  GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 120. 
 52.  Ortiz was estimating that the total costs of repatriation would entail some $1,653,342 
pesos for all the potential migrants. 
 53.  Martín González de la Vara, The Return to Mexico: the relocation of New Mexican 
families in Chihuahua and the conformation of a border region, in THE CONTESTED 
HOMELAND: A CHICANO HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO 1848-1854, 50 (2000). 
 54.  AHSRE, supra note 4. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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end of 1850. He had spent $39,110 pesos since the start of his mission, 
and various governmental officials and agencies had already 
forwarded around $36,167 pesos.57  
The government acknowledged that funding for repatriation was 
an ongoing problem, and that it may have had an effect on where 
individuals chose to live after the war. The Memoria submitted to the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1851 addressed this matter somewhat vaguely 
in its 43-page report in the following way: “Transfer of Mexican 
families: The government has given some quantities more for this 
object and has the satisfaction of announcing that there have already 
been formed in the territory of the Republic, new populations 
composed in their larger part by Mexicans that have emigrated from 
the lands given by the last treaty to the United States of the North. I 
should mention here that Don Gregorio Mier y Terán graciously ceded 
some lands for this object. The government believes that if it had been 
able to dispose of larger sums, the number of those that would have 
transferred to Mexico would have been greater.”58 The use of “some 
additional amounts” really means a total of a few thousand pesos and 
not more than 1% of the $15,000,000 the U.S. government provided 
for the lands ceded to them after the war.59 Given the postwar 
environment, foreign interventions, the Wars of Reform, a depleted 
treasury, and the continued war against “Indios Bárbaros,” perhaps 
more pressing concerns impeded such altruistic policies. 
VI. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT IN U.S. OPPOSITION TO REPATRIATION 
Opposition to Ortiz, or to his leadership of the first repatriation 
campaigns, did not deter ongoing efforts at repatriation by the national 
government or state governments across the new International 
Boundary. The repatriation of Mexican nationals to the state of 
Chihuahua did not end with this first Repatriation Commission, but 
instead it became a state-level initiative thereafter.60 The states of 
Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas each 
did their part to encourage and in some cases implement repatriation 
initiatives on their own, and each with their own regional 
particularities, too numerous to mention here. Ortiz resolved to try 
other avenues that encouraged return migration, as federal efforts were 
 
 57.  AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2977. 
 58.  Memoria del Ministro de Relaciones Interiores y Esteriores Leída en las Cámaras en 
1851, 29 (México: Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1851) (Mex.). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  González de la Vara, supra note 53, at 9–21. 
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thwarted and subsequently suspended.61 Where he was removed from 
New Mexico for encouraging repatriation, he was now being hired by 
the Government of Chihuahua to receive and settle those repatriates 
that had crossed into Mexican territory.62 
After Ortiz’ initial visit to El Vado, he moved on to La Cañada 
County, only to be forced to desist when the Military Governor of the 
Territory, Donaciano Vigil, prohibited the recruitment of repatriates. 
According to Ortiz, “The first day I was there about to enlist more than 
one hundred heads of families, who had appeared before me in 
compliance with the decree dated August 19, 1848, I received an 
official letter from the Governor of the territory.  In it, with the excuse 
that the gathering was disturbing the peace, he prohibited my 
appearing personally in the settlements of the territory.”63 In no 
uncertain terms Vigil made it clear that he would not permit “[Ortiz] 
personally to visit the different points of this territory for the purpose 
of setting forth [his] commission to the settlers.”64 With the backing of 
U.S. military officials, Vigil claimed Ortiz had “acted beyond” his 
“official capacity by making promises which are too extensive and 
which arouse a great deal of commotion,” among the potential 
repatriates.65 These accusations of “disturbing the peace” were not 
completely off the mark. Ortiz was known to harbor anti-American 
sentiments, which had in part led to his appointment as commissioner 
in the first place. Vigil thus prohibited Ortiz from appearing personally 
in any of the towns, thus putting an end to his Commission, at least at 
the federal level.  
Vigil, according to Ortiz, prohibited the repatriation of Mexicans 
from the territory “under the pretext that the disturbance was growing 
even in the capital and that he had received complaints from all the 
prefects in which they said that from the time of my arrival in the 
territory all the settlements had openly refused to obey them.”66 When 
Ortiz protested in face-to-face interviews with Vigil, the latter argued 
that Ortiz was inciting disturbances of the sort he had organized after 
the signing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.67 Ortiz emerges as a 
 
 61.  AHSRE, supra note 4. 
 62.  González de la Vara, supra note 53, at 9–21. 
 63.  AHSRE, supra note 4. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Letter from Donaciano Vigil to Ramón Ortiz, THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES 149 
(Apr. 29, 1849). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Correspondence of Ramón Ortiz, THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES, 144–49; see 
AHSRE, supra note 4, at L-E-1975 (XXV); see also AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971. 
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figure caught between his regional loyalty to the territories of the north, 
his patriotic sentiments toward the Mexican government, and his 
concern for a repatriate population more interested in pragmatic 
concerns than ideology. 
Some in Washington, D.C. echoing the concerns expressed by 
some local officials interpreted the repatriation of New Mexicans to 
Chihuahua as counterproductive to the normalization of relations 
between the U.S. and Mexico and a violation of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.68 Vigil’s affronts to repatriation efforts echoed a 
broader set of arguments that appealed directly to at least two 
interpretations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and thus reflected 
the still fresh wounds of battles over national sovereignty and border 
territory. The past of Father Ramón Ortiz, integral to this history, also 
became a factor in the way repatriation efforts would play out, and US 
officials had plenty of intelligence to justify their concerns. Strictly 
speaking, the repatriation of the population of Mexican origin was not 
part of the agreement reached on February of 1848 when both nations 
came together to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The U.S. 
Secretary of War, George W. Cranford pointed out to the Mexican 
Minister of Foreign Relations that “it is not perceived, examining the 
material, that Mexico has acquired any right, not even when it can be 
inferred that it possess it, to entice those inhabitants in the ceded 
territories to emigrate and conserve their citizenship returning to 
establish themselves within Mexican territory.”69 The treaty excluded 
the possibility of repatriation and consequently, so the argument went, 
the entry of a foreign representative such as Ortiz into New Mexico to 
encourage repatriation was prohibited. This unauthorized travel to 
depopulate a region of its inhabitants could then be framed in stark 
terms as an “invasion” in violation of the treaty.  In a remarkable 
political move, reminiscent of the Encomienda system of Spanish past, 
here the Treaty was interpreted to include not only the physical 
landscape, but also extended to the inhabitants of the ceded territories, 
the very population leading the charge against the native indigenes 
laying claim to the western territories.   
VII. A FEW OF THE NEW MEXICO TOWNS, BRIEFLY… 
In April of 1849 a small group of 2500 settlers were already 
occupying the area which would become the Colonia “Guadalupe de 
los Nobles,” and successive waves of repatriates would foster 
 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971. 
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resentment and competition for land in the years to come.70 New 
arrivals are always treated with resentment by earlier colonists. 
Resentment and competition between first settlers and later colonists 
is a universally well-known source of social conflict, and the 
distinctions can become harsher when these particularities are being 
resolved along a violent and volatile frontier.  These first settlers had 
“emigrated from the towns of Senecú, Ysleta, and San Elizario”—
locations and settlements that had been part of Chihuahua prior to the 
U.S. occupation.71  Although the commissioner articulated an objection 
to preferential treatment, the very material promises of the decrees 
undermine such a caveat. In his study of contemporary rural violence 
in Mexico, Sociologist Andrés Villarreal believes that “because the 
loss of land, or loss of good quality land, has a direct impact on the 
livelihood of the peasant and may indeed be life-threatening, conflict 
over land may be expected to turn more violent.”72 Favoritism and 
extortion, whether real or imagined, emerged as a constant theme in 
almost every repatriate colony that I examined. Gregorio Gándara, the 
commissioner of emigration from the border town of San Elizario, 
stipulated that the emigrants from just across the river should be treated 
the same as those coming from further away in New Mexico, and the 
need to underscore this apparent consideration only evidences the 
tension.73   
By April of 1850, it is estimated that six hundred families from 
New Mexico had migrated to the colonies of Guadalupe and San 
Ignacio.74 Governor Frías noted in the middle of March that migrants 
were arriving at the border towns of San Elizario and Isleta every day, 
and that more were to be expected. Frías estimated that “[t]wo 
thousand five hundred people to date exist in the colony of Guadalupe 
of those that have emigrated from New Mexico and of the towns of 
San Elizario, Socorro and Isleta belonging to this Villa; and new 
emigrants are arriving most of the days.”75 Two years later the 
population of Guadalupe appears at 1,015 individuals, while that of 
 
 70.  Id. at 2-13-2977. 
 71.  Samuel E. Sisneros, Los emigrantes nuevomexicanos: The 1849 repatriation to 
Guadalupe and San Ignacio, Chihuahua, Mexico, 46–54 (Dec. 2001) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Texas at El Paso) (on file at 
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/dissertations/AAIEP05556). 
 72.  See The Social Ecology of Rural Violence: Land Scarcity, the Organization of 
Agricultural Production, and the Presence of the State, 110:2 AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 
313–348 (Sep. 2004). 
 73.  Sisneros, supra note 71. 
 74. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2977. 
 75.  Id. 
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San Ignacio was at 232. Of this total, upwards of 550 colonists had 
come from the New Mexico Territory to these two colonies, according 
to the 1852 census, and per the analysis provided by Samuel Sisneros.76  
The preferential treatment of migrants from right across the river 
would serve to fuel internal tensions between earlier and newly arrived 
migrants. The early settlers were the keenest to secure better lands, the 
most abundant watering holes, and other advantages. The division 
between earlier and later settlers is universal, and as such social 
divisions within these colonies were transferred to the new locales and 
further complicated by successive waves of settlement.  
VIII. REPATRIATIONS FROM TEXAS 
The repatriation of the Mexican population in the region of Texas 
and Louisiana began in 1831 and experienced substantial increase with 
the many expulsions that occurred after so-called “Texas 
Independence” in 1835.77 The towns of Piedras Negras, Coahuila, and 
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas were also founded immediately following 
the war, and several locales in Coahuila would become the sites of 
repatriation as the century came to a close.78 Sociologist Davíd 
Montejano notes there was “considerable repatriation after the 
Mexican War,” in which “refugees” moved across the Rio Grande and 
settled “among the old established towns of El Paso del Norte, 
Guerrero, Mier, Camargo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.”79 Throughout 
the rest of the nineteenth century other important towns were founded 
and grew just across the new border, towns such as Nuevo Monterrey, 
Tamaulipas (now Nuevo Laredo), Piedras Negras, San Diego, San 
Juan, Palo Blanco, Agua Dulce, El Sauz, Los Olmos, San Luis, 
Pansacola, Zapata, San Ignacio, and Los Saenz.80  
 
 76.  Sisneros, supra note 71, at 158. 
 77.  José Angel Hernández, Mexican Expulsions & Indian Removal during the Early 
Period of Global Mass Immigrations, 30 WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN 30–34 (Jared Poley ed., 
2014). 
 78.  Otto Schober, Breve historia de Piedras Negras, PIEDRAS NEGRAS,  
http://www.piedrasnegras.gob.mx/contenido05/conoce-pn/historia/ (last visited May 10, 
2018). 
 79.  DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986, 
30 (2009). 
 80.  Arnoldo De León, Life for Mexicans in Texas after the 1836 Revolution, in MAJOR 
PROBLEMS IN MEXICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 167–175 (Zaragoza Vargas ed. 1999). The total 
number of towns founded or repopulated after the war requires an amount of detailed research 
that is not always easily accessible.  Indeed, one way in which to analyze this phenomenon 
would be for a research team to identify, quantify, and analyze the number of settlements 
established along the Mexican frontiers during and in the years following the war. 
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Many of the repatriates resettled in towns that were already well 
established and oftentimes right across the new international boundary, 
as in the case of Piedras Negras, Coahuila (A.K.A Ciudad Porfirio 
Díaz), which today sits across the border from Eagle Pass, Texas.81 
Because of its close proximity, it was obviously a notable repatriate 
destination. A local historian mentions that 34 repatriates arrived on 
June 15, 1850 to settle in what was then called “Colonia Militar de 
Guerrero en Piedras Negras.”82 Five years later, this settlement lost its 
military character and became an ordinary “civilian” outpost named 
simply “Piedras Negras.”  The population of Piedras Negras these days 
numbers around a quarter of a million citizens in the larger 
metropolitan area and constitutes its own city and municipality.83 
Today, the city of Piedras Negras generates millions of dollars in 
revenue as a major port of entry between the US and Mexico.84 A 
similar phenomenon has taken place in the case of Nuevo Laredo, 
Tamaulipas—also one of the most important trade routes between the 
United States—which we turn to now. 
Directly across the border (and river) from Laredo, Texas, the 
border town of Nuevo Laredo still holds celebrations that hearken to 
its foundational 1848 repatriations. On the surface, it appears 
repatriation across the new international boundary in this locale took 
place uneventfully, but this state of affairs should be both scrutinized 
more closely and placed within the broader context of postwar 
repatriation as a whole. Archival evidence exists that money and land 
were provided to support repatriation to Nuevo Laredo (known then as 
“La Colonia Civil in el Rio Salado”) and also to the town of Mier in 
neighboring Coahuila.85 According to some sources, the Governor of 
Tamaulipas wrote to the Minister of Foreign Relations to “receive and 
distribute the ten thousand three hundred and seventy-nine pesos 
destined for the Supreme Government for the aid of 502 individuals 
 
 81.  CARLOS FLORES REVUELTA AND ÁLVARO CANALES SANTOS, PIEDRAS NEGRAS: 
RESEÑA HISTÓRICA, PROTAGONISTAS, (Saltillo: Club del Libro Coahuilense, Editora el Dos, 
2004) (Mex.). 
 82.  Schober, supra note 78.  
 83.  For Piedras Negras population statistics, see the Official Government Website, 
http://www.piedrasnegras.gob.mx/2010/06/historia/.  
 84.   For Piedras Negras economic and trade statistics, see Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistíca y Geografía [National Institute of Statistics and Geography], 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/app/areasgeograficas/?ag=05#. 
 85.  Carta de Gobernador de Tamaulipas a Ministro de Relaciones Interiores y 
Exteriores, 15 Abril 1850, AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2976, “El gobernador de Tamaulipas 
pide se nombre al comisionado que haya de entenderse con la traslación de familias que 
soliciten venir a México y que vivido en E.U. de A. De acuerdo con el Tratado de Guadalupe, 
1850.” 
HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2018  1:40 PM 
2018] THE DECREE OF 19 OF AUGUST 1848 19 
from Laredo that should form a colony on the land ceded for this 
purpose by Don Gregorio de Mier y Terán,” i.e., the area of modern 
day Nuevo Laredo.86 Some records also exist pertaining to the 
establishment of the town of Mier in modern day Coahuila (then a part 
of the state of Tamaulipas). Fifty families “left in the territories ceded 
to the United States of America” were granted lands close to the town 
of “Villa de Mier, according to the Governor of Tamaulipas.”87 The 
founding of Nuevo Laredo and Mier are remarkable grassroots efforts 
considering that they occurred without the benefit of a government 
representative leading the effort. The relative ease with which the local 
population and the government could align in this case of repatriation 
was probably also due to its geographical proximity right across the 
new international boundary. In Laredo, repatriates need only to 
transfer their belongings to the opposite side of the river. One must 
also consider other, better-recorded cases in which repatriation did not 
appear to proceed nearly as smoothly, as was the case of El Remolino 
in the neighboring state of Coahuila. 
The 1850 repatriation of 618 individuals from Nacogdoches, 
Texas to El Remolino, Coahuila, approximately 150 kilometers away, 
presents an interesting test case for gauging the Mexican government’s 
commitment to the cause of repatriation. The repatriation from 
Nacogdoches was shaped largely from the problematic execution of 
appointing a Repatriation Commissioner for the eastern provinces. 
There was no government champion to spearhead the effort for the case 
of Texas as there was with Father Ramon Ortiz in New Mexico. In the 
end, the success of repatriation over this considerable distance relied 
much more on local intervention than the economic and political 
support of government authorities. Without being blind to a certain 
amount of self-interest in colonization, the relative success of the case 
of El Remolino seems to have rested largely on the shoulders of a 
prominent local official: Antonio Menchaca. Menchaca composed a 
list that provides the bare facts of the Nacogdoches to El Remolino 
repatriation.88 From the archival record, we learn that two hundred 
 
 86.  AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2974. Don Gregorio de Mier y Terán is probably one 
of the few individuals that donated a substantial amount of his land for repatriate colonization. 
 87.  Id. at 2-13-2976. 
 88.  Id. at 2-13-2975, “El Gobernador de Coahuila acompañando una solicitud de Don 
Antonio Menchaca vecino de Nacogdoches para trasladar a la República familias mexicanas. 
Se nombra comisionado al Gobernador de Nuevo León, 1850.” (Nominal list of Mexican 
families from Nacogdoches who remained on territory transferred to the United States in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and due to said treaties and the Decree of August 19, 1848, are 
conceded the right to transport themselves in Mexican territory).  
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families intended to settle in El Remolino.89 The total number of 
persons was 618, and 146 of these were under the age of 14, while the 
remaining 472 were over the age of 14. Only three female heads of 
household were listed by Menchaca in his correspondence with 
officials in Coahuila and Mexico City.      
Unlike the relatively successful cases of repatriations from New 
Mexico and perhaps California, the appointment of a Repatriation 
Commission for the Eastern Provinces ended in temporary disarray 
when the nominee, José Rafael De La Garza, rejected his appointment. 
Among the several candidates proposed initially was José María 
Carvajal, who years later would be accused of fraud and going beyond 
his jurisdiction by attempting to extend land grants to friends and 
cronies.90 De La Garza was the ultimate choice for commissioner and 
it was specified that “the quantity of ten thousand three hundred and 
seventy-nine pesos” should be allotted to him for the repatriation of 
individuals to Nuevo León if he were eventually named as Repatriate 
Commissioner for the region.91 Unfortunately for the officials in 
Mexico City, De La Garza declined his appointment that fall because 
of his current employment and other personal business matters. In his 
response to the officials, De La Garza stated: “I can barely and badly 
attend to [my own affairs] because of my public [obligations].”92 
Feeling overburdened, he resisted taking on any additional public 
duties and commented that “[M]y employment as Chief Treasurer of 
this State absorbs all of my attention, [and] my responsibility toward 
the same State and the circumstances of my private business would 
interfere with the work of the Repatriate Commission.”93 This rejection 
would later be made public to Mr. Menchaca of the Remolino 
repatriation, but not for another few months.  
The frustrations of Antonio Menchaca with respect to repatriation 
along the Texas border typified the kinds of relations that often 
developed between local officials and the central Mexican government 
in such efforts. Menchaca was still unaware that De La Garza had 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See CIUDAD JUAREZ MUNICIPAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM COLLECTION, microformed on 
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turned down the position of Commissioner and therefore went to the 
port of Matamoros in hopes of speaking with him in person. There he 
contacted the Mexican Consulate in Brownsville about De La Garza 
and ended up waiting three months for information about his 
whereabouts and the agency charged with repatriation.94 Menchaca 
was finally able to meet with De La Garza in late November, only to 
be shown a copy of the letter in which the appointee had formally (and 
respectfully) declined his appointment as Repatriation Commissioner 
for the region.95 Oddly enough, neither Menchaca nor the Consulate in 
Brownsville was ever informed through official channels of De La 
Garza’s rejection of the appointment. This lack of communication and 
other problems must surely have frustrated Menchaca and the 
hundreds of repatriates waiting to resettle across the border in the 
postwar environment.  At first it seemed as though government 
officials in Mexico City and the Foreign Ministry were warm to the 
mutual benefits of repatriating experienced frontiersmen as settlers of 
the northern frontiers. Only later when money became a factor did 
national interest waver, and patriotism as well. Menchaca invested a 
total of fourteen months traveling and petitioning the government for 
a Repatriation Commission to assist him in a serious case of postwar 
repatriation in the mid nineteenth century.   
Some thirty-eight months after Menchaca composed his nominal 
list, the number of repatriates and their families remained unchanged 
when Menchaca billed the federal government $20,632 pesos. He 
broke down his expenditures in the following manner: $1,752 for the 
146 persons under the age of 14 (allotted $12 each) and $11,800 for 
the 472 persons over the age of 14 (allotted $25 each).96 To this 
Menchaca added $7,080 pesos in unforeseen expenses as he financed 
and led this particular repatriation project toward the state of 
Coahuila.97 The Ministry of Foreign Relations responded to 
Menchaca’s request by saying that due to the “scantiness of the 
treasury” the government was currently not in a position to “make the 
proposed expenditure.”98 This kind of exchange typified relations 
between repatriates and advocates following the Mexican American 
War of 1846-1848.  The government response in this and many other 
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cases, though, is near universal: there is no money, but there is land. 
On various occasions, Menchaca attempted to use the power of 
the pen and a varied arsenal of arguments to solicit help from relevant 
authorities. In correspondence with the President of Mexico, 
Menchaca minced no words, describing the De La Garza appointment 
as “illusory” and insisting that Herrera’s government comply with the 
laws already on the books.99  Presumably this was a reference to the 
Decree of August 19, 1848, which “while being of use for the nation, 
also alleviates [the] misfortunate [emigrants].”100 Menchaca also wrote 
to the Governor of Coahuila, Rafael De La Fuente. From this 
correspondence we learn that Menchaca was aware of the Nuevo 
Laredo repatriation a few months earlier, and he could use the case to 
good advantage as a precedent. He described it as an “identical case 
that presented itself this year, regarding the emigration and 
establishment of the colony of Mier y Terán by Mexican families from 
Laredo.”101  In addition to being fair, a repatriation colony was due in 
order to “fulfill the aims of unfortunate Mexicans [and] to ease their 
difficult situation” and to realize the “noble and patriotic objectives” 
of the Repatriation Commission. This feat would engender “undying 
gratitude toward the sponsors,” argued Menchaca, if only the Mexican 
government would respond in the positive, and according to the law.102 
It appears that not only the repatriates themselves, but apparently a 
number of border governors as well, believed that the Mexican 
government had an obligation to its citizens now left in the ceded 
territories.   
De La Fuente jointly took up the cause with Menchaca and relied 
similarly on notions of precedent, fairness, humanitarian concern, 
patriotism, and pragmatic grounds. On behalf of Menchaca, De La 
Fuente composed a pointed appeal to the Minister of Foreign Relations 
in May of 1851 that included material culled from Menchaca’s 
correspondence. Menchaca asked, “[I]f Nuevo León [Laredo] was 
granted ten thousand pesos to transfer the neighbors of Laredo to a new 
colony inside its jurisdiction, should Coahuila be denied equal 
grace?”103 Monies gained from the Treaty, he argued, should rightly be 
applied toward the welfare of patriotic individuals who only 
circumstantially found themselves across the border from their 
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homeland.104 This government of Coahuila,” began De La Fuente, “did 
not doubt the patriotic sentiments of the national government in 
rescuing and assisting the return of Mexico’s sons back to the 
homeland.” Referring to the value of the lands lost after the Mexican 
American war, he went on to say:  
[T]hat this immense loss has not been reimbursed by the 
federation even though it be a considerable part of the land given to 
the neighboring Republic, and for which was reimbursed to the Nation 
the sum of fifteen million pesos; that for these circumstances the sons 
of Coahuila are entitled to be aided with preference in the necessary 
expenses for their adjournment to the territory of the Republic.105  
Like much of the documentation of the period relating to 
repatriation and colonization, practical concerns are also glossed over 
with the moral patina of national belonging and postwar suffering.  But 
such appeals were usually met with responses of scant treasuries and 
its accompanying discourse of “administrative disorder.”  Appealing 
to the nation’s sense of suffering and oppression, Menchaca 
maintained that Mexico should “transfer to her bosom the unfortunates 
that reside in Texas today reporting as Mexicans the injustices of the 
proud Americans that, with weapons in hand, required and obtained 
from Mexico those fertile lands.”106 At the very least, argued the 
Governor of Nuevo Leon, the government should do everything in its 
power “to rescue the unhappy Mexicans that by virtue of the treaty of 
Guadalupe remained foreigners in their own land, and of the 
misfortunes that afflict them.”107 In short order, the monies granted to 
the nation via the stipulations of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo should be applied to the very victims that had suffered the loss 
of land, namely the now fractured state of Coahuila y Tejas. 
The back-and-forth between the federal government and state 
officials endured for eight years and tested the patience of Menchaca 
and the Governor of the state of Coahuila. For years to come the Diario 
Oficial de Coahuila and various newspapers would continue to publish 
advertisements promising government support for the repatriation of 
Mexicans to the state.108  But repatriates also grew tired of waiting, and 
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many decided to deal with administrative matters at a later date. Some 
matters were in fact never resolved. In other cases, as with the 
repatriation of La Ascensión, Chihuahua, land titles were issued more 
than a decade later, though this did not end controversy over land 
matters.109 
Although little government aid came forward to contribute to the 
formation of this settlement, the repatriate colony of El Remolino, 
Coahuila would return to Mexico under difficult conditions and 
circumstances. Part of these conditions were motivated by the 
governments desire to populate the northern regions with loyal citizens 
to fight off “Indios Bárbaros”; to serve as a buffer zone against its 
northern neighbour; and to help thwart filibusters from Mexico and the 
US.110 The colony would subsequently be renamed “Resurrección” and 
then settled in a location that had earlier been La Colonia Militar de 
San Vicente, attesting to the military concerns of post-war colonization 
policy.  Repatriation throughout the nineteenth century was therefore 
not a policy based on nationalist sentiment or impulse, but one more 
interested in maintaining territorial hegemony and a military presence 
along the frontier.111 The archival trail ends here, but today El 
Remolino is a town of about four hundred individuals—with a majority 
(71%) considered “indigenous,” and about 24% speaking an 
indigenous language.112 
The case of El Remolino illustrates several important issues.  
First, arguments in favor of supporting repatriation in the Eastern 
Provinces could be made based on: (A) Legal/Treaty obligations, (B) 
precedent in comparison with other repatriations, and (C) on 
humanitarian grounds.  Second, the inadequate response of the 
Mexican government in this case supported widespread claims of 
“administrative disorder” of the Herrera government as well as the 
divide between regional and federal authorities in mid nineteenth 
century Mexican politics. At the national level, the Menchaca case 
shows us that state governments had little power or influence in 
postwar Mexico. If states had difficulty in their appeals for federal aid 
or assistance, then surely repatriates would likely have suffered a 
similar fate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a persuasive 
argument could be made that there was an unresolved contradiction in 
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repatriation policy in the years after the Mexican American War, 
namely, that the very monies intended for supporting those within the 
ceded territories were never appropriately directed toward victims of 
the war. Of the $15 million dollars paid by the U.S. as recompense for 
the ceded territories, less than 1% made its way into the hands of the 
actual victims of this “sale.”  Guillermo Prieto, one time finance 
minister, perhaps said it best with the following: “If you ask what use 
Mexico made of all the money it got from the United States as a result 
of its national tragedy, you should answer, without hesitation, that it 
wasn’t in material improvements, defending the borders, or for public 
safety.  It went, almost entirely, to our creditors, foreigners mostly.”113 
IX. BACK TO MEXICO MOVEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, CA. 1850S 
The Governor of Sonora, Pesquiera, correctly pointed out the 
three factors that hindered the successful colonization of the frontier—
Indian raiding, depopulation caused by emigration, and insecurity.114 
These issues were intertwined and not easily resolved. Unless the 
government solved the question of Indian raiding first, neither 
repatriation nor long-term stability would have much of a chance along 
the northern frontier. For the Governor, it was clear that “the day that 
those incursions of the barbarians are finished, at that same moment 
the state will remain populated.”115 While the “Indios Bárbaros” were 
still not under the control of the state and “the border is found in the 
abandonment that it is currently found, it is impossible to be able to 
stimulate the population with any kind of offers.”116 And so the process 
appeared to be a self-perpetuating mechanism, which only an end to 
raiding and attacks could interrupt. Though framed from the 
perspective of government interest, the Governor provides a 
remarkable early recognition of the ironic, Mexican American 
predicament of having to leave Mexican roots in the hope of one day 
returning better able to sustain them.  He notes that those with property 
“abandon it” and then migrate to the U.S., while “the ones that do not 
have it, seek it to leave it…in the hopes that at some time they will 
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have it.”117     
In contrast to the cases of Texas and New Mexico, California 
support for repatriation seem to sprout from the ground amid 
government inaction, or if you prefer, “administrative disorder.” In this 
case repatriation would be buttressed by the institutional interests of a 
secularized Catholic Church, by the accessible and mobile wealth of 
California gold, and by an accompanying re-distribution of labor 
involving significant ethnic based expulsions from California. As in 
other regions, the indigenous population fighting for autonomy formed 
a common enemy for US and Mexican national boundaries that were 
perpetually contested. In California, the prime movers of repatriation 
were not so much prominent individuals like Menchaca in Texas or 
Ortiz in New Mexico, but by the group efforts of a variety of religious 
and secular societies that formed during the period to fulfill the 
aforementioned interests of returning to Mexico during times of 
economic and social stress. 
After gold was discovered in newly lost California in 1849, a 
number of government officials pondered how Mexico could benefit 
from some of the riches that were being extracted while the area was 
simultaneously being depopulated.118 Gold, in this context, functioned 
like a magnet that attracted groups of Mexican miners from their much 
needed posts occupying the northern frontier. Already burdened by the 
need to populate the deserts of Sonora, the Gold Rush now pulled these 
very settlers away from the sparsely populated frontiers that cleared 
the way for easier raiding by independent Amerindians, which also 
guaranteed their autonomy. In other words, migration to the gold 
placers of California left the neighboring state of Sonora open to 
various Indian raids due precisely to this migratory depopulation 
heading northward toward the gold placers.  
Alluding to the silver lining in the depopulation of the frontiers, 
General Ignacio Pesquiera, the Governor of Sonora, noted that, 
although return migration was evident, the “returning citizens appear 
to be motivated to return to the next station of the works,” and many 
of them returned with vast amounts of wealth.119 They in turn “excited 
many others” to make the trip northward.  If this work was not 
“absolutely impeded” by local authorities, the Governor estimated that 
“next year’s emigration from this state will be surpassed in a somewhat 
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greater number by this year’s emigrants.”120 Unless they were 
prevented from working in the mines, this northern migration could 
spiral out of control and with dire consequences for the frontier states 
of Sonora. 
Mexicans in search of work and of riches in gold country entered 
a frenzied field composed not only of Euro American and Chinese 
miners, but also Peruvian, Chilean, Spanish, and other “Latins” who 
drew successfully from the mining expertise they had acquired in their 
home countries.121 On the ground, reaction to “foreign” competition in 
the mines took the form of an escalated level of violence in various 
locales in Gold Rush California, culminating in the formation of 
various extralegal “vigilante committees” and passage of questionable 
laws.122 The courts reacted to growing multi ethnic conflicts by passing 
the “Foreigner Miner’s Tax of 1851,” which levied a $20 per capita fee 
on all “foreigners” wanting to stake claims in the gold placers of Upper 
California.123 This racially targeted legislation applied to non-Euro 
Americans; that is, those not of the “white race,” thus fueling the 
number of potential repatriates for the states of Baja California, 
Sonora, and Sinaloa.124 The Mexican government recognized that such 
legislation and, even perhaps border violence as well, could serve its 
interests by curtailing emigration and forcing its citizens to remain in 
those lands “infested by Indios Bárbaros.” With this background in 
mind, the Governor of Sonora, Ignacio Pesquiera, initiated some of the 
first colonization policies for Mexican Americans in that state. 
“Incensed by outrages committed [in the goldmines] by the Anglo 
Americans against…Mexican Americans,” Pesquiera “offered lands to 
the victims, aiding them and at the same time colonizing the lands.”125 
In the process, according to the historian Enrique Cortés, the Governor 
“set the stage for a pattern that was repeated throughout the rest of the 
century.”126 
Governor Pesquiera was not alone in his condemnation of “Euro 
American” ill treatment of the working classes and the migrant 
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Mexican American populace. Several other politicians and 
government officials put forth proposals to hasten the repatriation of 
Mexican Americans while others supported the establishment of 
military colonies on the northern frontiers of the newly established 
international boundary.127 But very little assistance was forthcoming 
from the central government. As in Texas, the most vocal and articulate 
advocates for repatriation were Governors and politicians from the 
border region itself. But their outrage did not translate into material 
assistance or an organized repatriation process for at least four more 
years. The answers were consistently always the same: the treasury is 
depleted and the government is in “administrative disorder.”128 
Still, a northern circuit with a lid on it presented a significant 
potential benefit to the Mexican state. The unusual wealth available to 
prospecting potential repatriates was well recognized, by those of the 
frontiers, and those far removed from the border. Pesquiera observed, 
“It can be calculated that more than 300 [migrants] have returned and 
others are arriving daily, to such a manner that it can be expected that 
that we will not lose all of this part of the emigrated population.”129 
And, even in the face of long and dangerous journeys, returning 
Sonorans “come very satisfied with the wealth of those bonanzas and 
they report that except for the crime of robbery, all the others enjoy 
immunity.”130  Many documents relating to Sonoran history point out 
that Sonorans returned from the gold placers of California with 
millions of pesos worth of gold.131 However, the borders drawn 
between the U.S. and Mexico were also superimposed on land still 
claimed by many indigenous groups willing to die and raid in its 
defense.  This presented a dilemma for any who had designs on the 
wealth in the region’s natural resources.    
The central government in Mexico City appears to have 
administered the repatriation of Alta California as it did in Coahuila 
and Chihuahua—that is to say reactively instead of proactively. At 
least with respect to repatriation, Historian Griswold del Castillo has 
noted that Californios in particular “had little financial help from the 
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Mexican government in these ventures.”132 Yet repatriation was 
successfully conducted from California to Sonora and to various 
locales along the northern Mexican frontiers due primarily to the 
repatriates themselves.  So who or what lay behind these 
resettlements?  Part of the answer lies with the way repatriation were 
also contingent upon the depopulation of northern Mexican states, the 
violence and opportunity of the Gold Rush in California, and the 
formation of regional Repatriation Societies.      
X. REPATRIATION SOCIETIES AND LOCAL PROTECTION 
In the face of government neglect, Californios and Mexican 
residents in California responded to the violence and land 
displacement in a highly organized fashion by forming repatriation 
societies. Independent and self-funded repatriation societies such as 
Jesús Islas’ La Junta para Promover la Emigración de Todos los 
Hispanos-Americanos Residentes en California (The Steering 
Committee to Promote Immigration of All Hispanic-Americans Living 
in California) and Andrés Pico’s La Sociedad de Colonización de 
Nativos de California para el Estado de Sonora (The Colonization 
Society of Native Californians for the State of Sonora), founded in 
1855 and 1858, respectively, sprang up and established a trend in 
California that we will not see for the other regions: the patriotic 
naming of colonization and repatriation societies.133 By the time of the 
Porfiriato (1876-1911), several more organizations of this kind had 
come into being, such as Compañía de colonos para la Republica 
Mexicana (1875), Compañía de colonos “La Esperanza” (1878), and 
Sociedad de Colonización Benito Juárez (1880).134 Many of the 
colonization schemes, like Pico’s La Sociedad de Colonización (1855) 
were advanced “during the height of racial conflict and violence.”135 If 
neither Mexico nor the US could respond, it was articulated at the time, 
then locals took matters into their own hands and moved southwards 
to Mexico in what can be termed a “back to Mexico” movement.   
In 1855, Jesús Islas founded a colonization society in San José 
that managed to recruit hundreds of people throughout California “by 
running advertisements in the newspapers.”136 According to Griswold 
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Del Castillo, Islas’ success “spurred others to imitation.” La Junta para 
Promover la Emigración de Todos los Hispanos-Americanos 
Residentes en California offered a similar rationale for returning to 
México in an 1855 announcement.137 “Their major purpose,” 
accordingly, “was to escape the inhospitable social and economic 
climate of Anglo-American dominated California.”138 To promote 
repatriation, Islas published an extensive broadside entitled Situacion 
de los Habitantes Ispano-Americanos en el Estado de la Alta 
California, printed in Mazatlán on 26 June 1855, which was carried by 
at least one newspaper in California, El Clamor Público. Written as a 
kind of manifesto, this document details how Mexican American 
repatriation would benefit both potential colonists and the Mexican 
government.  A close reading reveals not only references to 
humanitarian concern for the mistreatment of patriotic Mexican 
Americans, but also the contradictory nature of that discourse when 
gauged against state concerns for its failing economy and threatened 
northern perimeters.  
Islas begins his appeal for repatriation, not by mentioning the 
violence visited upon the Mexican population, but by sketching the 
larger structural forces that compelled him and other Californios to 
seek better economic opportunities elsewhere. In effect, the author is 
patently aware of a global economic crisis that has subsequently 
impacted the lives of a population which now sought repatriation in 
Mexico.  As his opening salvo states, “[T]he epoch has arrived in 
which the extravagance of the [gold] speculations, and the great 
importance of foreign products, has brought a great monetary crisis, 
that has caused the ruin of most of the bankers and innumerable 
mercantile stores, as well as the complete annihilation of agriculture in 
general.”139 The collapse of the agricultural sector to which he refers 
had hit the “Ispano-Americanos,” made up of “Californios, 
Mexicanos, Chilenos, and Peruanos,” particularly hard.  By the time of 
the publication of his broadside, the fallout from the Gold Rush was 
unfolding before his eyes as migrants and other foreigners began to 
seek out other opportunities. Perhaps it is no coincidence that in this 
document, so-called “Ispano-Americanos” are framed as only suited to 
performing agricultural labor, thereby ignoring the legislation and 
racialized climate that excluded even the highly skilled from work in 
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the mining sector:  He states, 
It should be observed that most of the Hispanic-American 
population, which includes Californios, Mexicans, Chileans, 
Peruvians, etc. etc. had been dedicated to the work of agriculture, that, 
due to the complete paralysis of and lack of appreciation for the 
productivity of the country, they have all been obliged to abandon their 
fields and labors and they are today found ruined and unable to secure 
a destiny; and being the only work that the Spanish class can dedicate 
itself to, given that in no other industry would they be able to compete 
with the Saxon race, because they lack the necessary know-how, they 
are seen today therefore in the saddest situation and without hope for 
the future. Besides it should be added that one of the causes of the 
discontent and general displeasure is the mistreatment that the 
Hispanic-American population has received from certain classes of the 
American populace.140 
Reminders of the injustices this population had suffered could 
play well on the patriotic sentiments of border officials and private 
landowners across the border. Yet this bad treatment by the Americans 
could also align with an ongoing military strategy. Islas states that 
these potential colonists alone are “able to contain the advances of the 
barbarous apache.”141 Officials who hoped to contain the “Barbarous 
Indians” simultaneously sought to make use of Mexicans residing in 
the U.S. for this purpose, and would offer them lands, tax concessions, 
and free passage to government-sponsored colonies as enticements.142 
The designs harbored by Mexican officials can be discerned by 
the manner in which Mexican American labor is framed in 
contradictory ways. The “energy” and “strength” of new migrants and 
their families is always noted in the archival record, but the unique 
 
 140.  Id.: 
“Debe observarse que la mayor parte de la población Ispano-Americana, que 
comprende Californios, mexicanos, chilenos, peruanos, etc.  Se habían dedicado 
al giro de agricultura, las que por causa de la completa paralización y ningún 
aprecio de las producciones del país, se han visto todos obligados a abandonar 
sus labores y trabajos y se encuentran hoy arruinados y sin poder obtener destino; 
y siendo el único giro al que la clase española puede dedicarse, pues en ninguna 
otra industria podrían competir con la raza sajona, por carecer de los 
conocimientos necesarios, se ven hoy pues en la más triste situación y sin 
esperanzas en lo futuro.  Además debe agregarse que una de las causas del 
descontento y disgusto general, es el mal tratamiento que la población Hispano-
Americana ha recibido de ciertas clases del pueblo americano.” 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Emigración a Sonora: A los Mexicanos, Hispano Americanos y Californios; 
Manifiesto, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (Feb. 16, 1856). 
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positionality of Californios as potential repatriates was presented with 
a particular regional twist. Islas advanced the idea that, among the 
different candidate populations available to occupy the northern 
territories, only Mexican American repatriates would thrive given their 
existing “compatibilities” with Mexico:   
And what better time for Sonora to take advantage of the 
circumstances, which under its liberal and protective laws, is the only 
emigration that is acceptable because of its language, religion and 
customs? Right now is the time to populate its frontiers with a 
population that is useful, energetic, and trained by contact with the 
Saxon race, the only one that is able to contain the advances of the 
barbarous apache.143  
Thus, even after decrying the mistreatment of Mexican 
Americans and framing them suitable only for agriculture, he also 
posits that it is precisely “contact with the Saxon race” that makes his 
potential repatriates so desirable for Mexico in general, and Sonora in 
particular.  Note here, as well, that Isla’s points out that these potential 
repatriates are the best colonists because they have also been “trained 
by the Saxon race.”  Notably, the discourse that Mexican migrants in 
the US as somehow better that those that never left continues to this 
very day, and here we have future leader of the Repatriation 
Commission for the Western Region articulating this folk belief in the 
mid nineteenth century. 
XI. ISLAS’ COLONY AND THE MIXED MESSAGES OF REPATRIATION 
On October of 1855, Francisco P. Ramírez, editorial writer for El 
Clamor Público criticized the Mexican government and wrote an 
extensive editorial that “encouraged [California] Mexicans and 
Chileans to join Isla’s Junta Colonizadora de Sonora and return to 
Mexico.”144 Disillusioned by the U.S. government’s lack of concern 
about Euro American racism, Ramírez continued to support these 
“back to  Mexico movements” even when it appeared that politicians 
in Mexico City would not be forthcoming with monetary support. The 
commotion and enthusiasm for the project attracted the attention of 
local and federal officials who noted the benefits of this migration to 
the frontiers of the Mexican Republic. According to Islas’ report 
published in the local paper, the project was received with “great 
 
 143.  Id.; reprinted in Situación de los Hispano-Americanos en California, 19 EL CLAMOR 
PÚBLICO (Oct. 23, 1955). 
 144.  Id. 
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enthusiasm by all of the populations of the state,” including the 
Governor and the large landowners, “to protect the emigrants that 
settle along the frontiers of the state.” For instance, locals came to the 
aid of Islas’ project in Sonora. The village of Ures donated 200 fanegas 
of wheat, 100 head of cattle, and land for those cattle as well as for the 
production of cotton, sugar, and indigo.145  
Recognizing the enthusiasm for Islas’ project earlier that year, the 
federal government encouraged the state of Sonora to cooperate with 
this “patriot” and appointed him as the colonization agent for the same 
state.  Always mindful of useful anti-American sentiment, the Minister 
of Fomento, Manuel Siliceo maintained that there were “great 
advantages” to welcoming these Gold Rush repatriates: “they do not 
mix with the Anglo-Saxon race,” with whom they lacked a common 
culture, and would fare much better as colonists in Sonora.146 Thus, 
unlike the relatively organized Repatriate Commission of New 
Mexico, or the botched appointment of the Eastern Provinces, the case 
of the Repatriation Commission for the Western states was a case 
where government officials in Mexico City co-opted the most visible 
leader of a repatriation society and appointed him as Repatriation 
Commissioner for the region.   
In early 1856 Islas recruited around 300 people for his 
colonization project and headed out for Sonora.147 News of the Islas 
colony reached the Californio audience back at home via El Clamor 
Público. By June of 1856, El Clamor Público noted that “more persons 
than could conveniently be taken” continued to arrive and were 
awaiting financial support for the journey. For the time being, Los 
Angeles would be their base of operations.148 As success of the colony 
became widely known, more and more repatriates set out for the 
colony, now known as Saric, Sonora.  At this time, according to 
Griswold del Castillo, “it appeared that this colonization venture was 
succeeding” and Islas reported the following a few months later: “We 
are living peacefully and breathing the pure and agreeable air of this 
beautiful climate.”149 
But negative reports also surfaced, including one that alleged that 
 
 145.  Emigración a Sonora, supra note 142. 
 146.  Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612. This letter and four point 
suggestion was also published in the 1856 publication of “Ministerio de Fomento,” (May 10, 
1856). 
 147.   La Colonia, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (June 7, 1856). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 121. 
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the Islas colony had joined in a rebellion against the central 
government.150 The prosperity of the Islas’ colony in Sonora opened a 
space among the Mexican community in California to debate the 
merits of this process, and it appears that not all were in favor of 
resettling in a country that had already abandoned them once. Making 
a case that had been raised in New Mexico (and later in San Antonio, 
Texas), locals questioned the logic of returning to a government so 
fraught with “administrative disorder” and a history of abandoning the 
frontier regions to “barbarous Indians” and then North Americans.151 
In an extensive and critical letter signed by “California,” the author 
noted the past history of the Mexican state left much to be desired.152 
Colonists returning to Sonora would be subjected to “undisciplined 
military officials and mercenaries” that have ruined the local 
population with levies and forced contributions, according to his view.  
Several exchanges for and against return migration were recorded 
in El Clamor Público between a number of authors, but in the end, the 
Islas colonization project proceeded forward and settled repatriates. 
The “failed colonizations” of Texas and Coatzacoalcos in the 1820s, 
the authors reminded the readers of El Clamor Público, were proof 
enough of the government’s incompetence. The reason for these past 
failures, were “for the very simple reason that although the government 
of Mexico has judgment and discernment, the Mexicans do not have it 
and with their anarchic craziness do not allow the realization of useful 
business,” as the example of past colonization projects had effectively 
proven.153 Living under U.S. rule was much better than living under a 
Mexican regime that only a few years earlier had passed their fate into 
the “hands of strangers.”154 “When were we the most happy, when we 
pertained to the Mexican Republic or now?” asked the author.155 And 
although wishing the colonists and the enterprise well, the letter writer 
echoed the sentiment expressed by previous critics who argued that 
Los Angeles was historically the refuge of Sonorans. The government 
of Mexico, always in constant revolt and in “administrative disorder,” 
made promises that it could not keep, and any repatriate would 
probably be swept up in one of the many uprisings.156  
Some recent research in Baja California in 2015 also revealed 
 
 150.  Sonora, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (Dec. 13 1856). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Comunicado, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (May 24, 1856). 
 154.  Más Sobre la Emigración a Sonora, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (May 17, 1856). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.  
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some further documentation on the case of Jesús Islas, which is worth 
mentioning here in order to conclude this multi-state analysis of 
repatriation and settlement along the northern frontiers of the republic 
following the postwar environment. In early January of 1856, the 
Ministro de Gobernación in Mexico City wrote to the governor of 
Sonora that Jesús Islas repatriate colony was merely a ploy whose 
underlying intention was to filibuster and separate Sonora from 
Mexican control. Amid the varying revolts against the central 
government, like El Plan de Ayutla (1855); Wars of Reform (1857-
60); and El Plan de Tacubaya (1858), the governor was forced out of 
office at the highest levels. Thereafter Jesus Islas was terminated as the 
Repatriation Commissioner for the western region. Mexican officials 
acknowledged the “sad situation that our compatriots keep,  and other 
individuals of the Spanish race,” but also realized that these 
colonization schemes could also be employed to speculate empty lands 
and then foment rebellions against the state, as in the case of the Ainza 
Brothers.157  
According to the exchange between the federal government and 
the Governor of Sonora, the document makes note of the fact that 
particular news had been obtained from the Secretary, Don Francisco 
Tena, and others whom confirmed the idea that the colonization 
company headed by the Ainza Brothers was purely interested in the 
speculation of lands, and they have attempted to justify certain 
payments by The Mexican government and then find a motive or a 
pretext to make claims for payment by the same government.158 The 
observations that are shared between the government officials are 
worthy of note because they speak to a much more nuanced view of 
Mexican officials during this era. They note that although the family is 
a native of the state of Sonora this individual was an under aged minor 
when his family migrated over to California in the year of 1805. This 
individual, the report continued, resided along with three of his 
brothers, and each of these was also married to a woman from the 
United States. As such, the exchange points out these marriages have 
formed an interconnection between the families and the brothers have 
now essentially taken on the customs and culture, and even the 
inclinations of that particular country, which is to say the United 
States. According to the exchange, these brothers have more affection 
 
 157.  Desautorización de José de Aguilar, gobernador de Sonora, para que Jesús Islas, 
quien se supone agente de colonización, envíe a sonorenses radicados en California a 
colonizar terrenos en Sonora. Ures, 1 julio 1856, ARCHIVO DEL INSTITUTO DE 
INVESTIGACIONES HISTÓRICAS (Fondo Pablo Herrera Carrillo, Universidad Autónoma de Baja 
California) (Mex.). 
 158.  Id. 
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for California then for their native country, and Jesus Isla’s is 
essentially part of that same family and mentality. Finally, the letter 
establishes the relationship between these brothers and their brother-
in-law Henry A. Crabb, whose name in Sonoran history is well known 
as the last filibuster defeated by the Mexican government and their 
indigenous allies. Mexican government officials also made the 
observation that one of the brothers was perhaps “mentally ill” in his 
attempts to try to convince the people of Sonora to separate from the 
Mexican Government, but in the end the local prefect had him arrested 
and Jesus Islas was also removed from his position.159 
XII. CONCLUSION 
In comparing the three cases of repatriation, the divergent 
experiences of each of these cases reveals and almost too perfect 
analogy for the repatriates experience in the post-war era. And 
although I’ve only discussed a few cases in this particular article, I’ve 
examined similar cases of repatriation and subsequent colonization 
throughout the rest of the century, certainly enough to make the claim 
here that repatriates from the North and migrants from the south built 
the modern day border between the US and Mexico. Hence, this 
particular microcosm does reveal some patterns about the first 
Repatriation Commissions and the experience of those repatriates 
returning to Mexico under the decree of August 19, 1848.  
The case of New Mexico, because it was the most heavily 
populated and the best-known of the three locations, became the locus 
of most government attention, and most success, as it turns out. 
Because the government moved quickly to appoint the well-known 
anti-American Priest, Father Ramon Ortiz to the position, the 
dissolution of this repatriate commission did not impede future 
government efforts to effectively repatriate and resettle those Mexican 
citizens that opted to return South after the end of hostilities.  
The case of Texas, as it turns out, also reveals an experience that 
can be read in the correspondence throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century, and this is that even amid periods of administrative disorder, 
many repatriates took it upon themselves to leave South, with or 
without the assistance of the government. What is with less doubt, is 
the fact that these repatriates initially sought out the assistance of The 
Mexican government.  The option to either return, migrate southward, 
or petition the Mexican government also highlights their belief not 
 
 159.  Id. 
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only in their own rights as citizens, but also their faith in the role of the 
Mexican government during this time. The correspondence between 
the Federal, State, and Local government is revealing and makes 
interesting arguments in favor of this diasporic diplomatic 
relationship—for lack of a better term.  
The final case of California also reveals perhaps the most negative 
of the experiences, in that a number of repatriates that did return south, 
did so under some dubious circumstances and with intentions not in 
line with those of the Mexican Government. As we saw in the case of 
Jesus Islas, his initial project calling for the repatriation of Mexicans 
in California to return to Sonora in the 1850s led to his collusion with 
a number of filibusters that were eventually defeated only a few years 
later. Indeed there are multiple cases in the Mexican archive where 
Mexican repatriates also became sources of conflict, to such a high 
degree, that the Mexican Government so fit to create an agency that 
would go after and prosecute those Mexicans that encouraged others 
that seceding from the Mexican Nation was a good idea.  
The fallout of the postwar environment brought about the 
Department of Colonization and the first Repatriation Commissions 
dedicated to the repatriation and resettlement of Mexican origin 
populations in the U.S.   The primary function of these Repatriate 
Commissions was to identify, administer, and then to accommodate 
those Mexican citizens that opted to migrate across the new 
international boundary following the signing of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848).  Because the New Mexico Territory was 
the most heavily populated, the creation of the First Repatriation 
Commission for this region was considered the most important of the 
three eventual assignments. Post-war instabilities, strapped financial 
resources, shifting geo-political boundaries, resistance by U.S. 
authorities, and internal accusations of financial mismanagement and 
corruption all contributed to the dissolution of these initial Repatriation 
Commissions.  Legislation implemented to encourage Mexican 
citizens to return via the Department of Colonization and the 
Repatriation Commissions provided both the power of the Law and the 
agents of the government to the foundation of dozens of settlements 
along the newly established frontiers. In the end, colonies nevertheless 
emerged along the northern frontiers between the New Mexico 
Territory and through Baja California, due mainly to the will and 
survival skills of the repatriates themselves. 
 
